A Trying Balance: Determining the Trier of Fact in Hybrid Admiralty-Civil Cases by Kurland, Lily
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 4 
2013 
A Trying Balance: Determining the Trier of Fact in Hybrid 
Admiralty-Civil Cases 
Lily Kurland 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lily Kurland, A Trying Balance: Determining the Trier of Fact in Hybrid Admiralty-Civil Cases, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1293 (2013). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1293 
A TRYING BALANCE: DETERMINING  
THE TRIER OF FACT IN HYBRID  
ADMIRALTY-CIVIL CASES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although admiralty is among the law’s oldest practices, it continues to 
play a vital role in modern litigation—whether that be through the 
transportation of goods on rivers or people on cruise ships. Prior to 1966, a 
federal court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction relied on a different set 
of rules than when it acted in law or equity.
1
 To accommodate this 
distinction, cases were placed on separate dockets based on the court’s 
source of jurisdiction.
2
 This system resulted in procedural differences that 
set admiralty claims apart from others.
3
 Admiralty cases were historically 
tried before the bench,
4
 while common law claims, as protected by the 
Seventh Amendment,
5
 were tried before a jury.
6
 In an effort to modernize 
admiralty law and prevent the dismissal of valid claims for procedural 
technicalities,
7
 the admiralty and civil dockets were unified in 1966.
8
 “The 
resulting joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply 
to all cases and make it possible to join both admiralty and nonadmiralty 
claims in a single action.”9 These cases are treated as hybrid admiralty-
civil cases. While the 1966 unification corrected many of the dual-docket 
difficulties, it created two new problems of its own.
10
 First, should a judge 
or jury determine the facts in a hybrid admiralty-civil case when each 
claim has an independent basis for federal jurisdiction?
11
 Second, should 
the court undertake a separate analysis to determine the fact-finder in a 
hybrid case when the civil claim does not have an independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction? If so, what should this analysis look like and which 
 
 
 1. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 9–10 (4th ed. 2004). 
 2. FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 392 (6th ed. 2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra note 52. 
 6. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 392. 
 7. Brainerd Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty Rules: Why and How, 17 ME. L. REV. 
1, 13–14 (1965). Among these procedural technicalities was “dismissal of actions filed on the wrong 
‘side’ of the court . . . .” Id. at 14. 
 8. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 9. Mark Thomas Mahfouz, Whose Interests Are More Important: Should a Plaintiff’s Rule 9(h) 
Designation “Trump” a Counterclaimant’s Right to Jury Trial?, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 277, 277 (2002). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 277–78. 
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trier of fact should determine the case outcome? The Supreme Court has 
failed to answer these questions,
12
 leaving the circuits split.
13
 
This Note analyzes and evaluates the conflict among courts for both of 
these questions. Part I introduces the current conflict among circuits. Part 
II presents a general history of admiralty courts and law with an emphasis 
on its international development as a separate body of courts and its 
procedure before and after the 1966 unification. Part III explores the three 
approaches adopted by courts in determining the trier of fact when both 
the admiralty and civil claims have independent bases for federal 
jurisdiction. Part IV examines the approaches adopted by courts in 
determining the trier of fact when the civil claim does not have an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Part IV, utilizing the approach 
adopted by many courts, separates those claims involving limitation of 
liability proceedings
14
 from those without such an action. Part V analyzes 
the conflict among the courts and proposes an answer to each of the two 
questions above. When each claim comprising a hybrid admiralty-civil 
case has an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the court should 
attempt to sever the claims so as to preserve the common law jury right 
and the admiralty bench trial. If the facts of the claims are so intertwined 
as to make severance impossible, the civil litigant’s jury right must trump 
the traditional admiralty bench trial. When the civil claim in a hybrid case 
does not have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the traditional 
admiralty bench trial should be preserved in all but one situation—when 
the civil litigant is forced into federal court through the initiation of a 
limitation of liability proceeding.  
II. HISTORY 
A. The Historical Development of Separate Admiralty Courts 
Admiralty law can be defined in both general and specific terms.
15
 
Generally, admiralty is the body of law “which regulates the activity of 
carrying cargo and passengers over water.”16 Specifically, admiralty rules 
 
 
 12. Id. at 277. 
 13. See, e.g., In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2007); Wilmington Trust v. 
United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1991); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo 
of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1983); Harrison v. Flota Mercante 
Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 14. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 15. See MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
 16. Id. 
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“govern contract, tort, and worker compensation claims arising out of 
travel on or over water.”17 Maritime law18 first developed along the coast 
of the Mediterranean Sea
19
 as a separate system of courts established to 
resolve conflict among the trading countries.
20
 These rules, which were 
eventually codified, served as the foundation for the development of 
European admiralty law.
21
 The “Mediterranean concept of maritime law” 
arrived in the United States through British colonialism.
22
  
In the American colonies, the English granted maritime jurisdiction to 
vice-admiralty courts.
23
 After the American Revolution, the Articles of 
Confederation granted to state courts original jurisdiction over matters of 
“prizes and piracy.”24 Congress had the authority to regulate these matters 
and establish an appeals court for “dealing with prizes and captures.”25 
The state-federal admiralty dichotomy caused multiple problems
26
 and 
“undoubtedly prompted the inclusion in the United States Constitution of 
 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. For the purpose of this Note, I use the terms “maritime” and “admiralty” interchangeably. 
 19. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. The Mediterranean Sea served as the highway of trade 
for its surrounding countries. Resolving conflicts among these countries “presented jurisdictional and 
procedural problems not shared by controversies involving less transient parties.” Id.; see Dale Van 
Demark, Grubert v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company: A Reasonable Conclusion to the Debate 
on Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction, 17 PACE L. REV. 553, 558 (1997). 
 20. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. These codes include the Tablets of Amalfi and the Rules 
of Oleron. Id. The individual codes were eventually unified into general maritime principles, but 
remained distinct from non-admiralty rules. Id. 
 21. England, among other European nations, adopted the Mediterranean maritime laws. “When 
the maritime courts in English ports were unable to make satisfactory disposition of piracy and spoil 
claims, they were replaced by courts under the jurisdiction of the Lord of the Admiralty.” Id. The 
British High Court of Admiralty’s early jurisdiction was very broad. Stanley Morrison, The Remedial 
Powers of the Admiralty, 43 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1933). Its breadth, however, was significantly narrowed 
over the course of time by the courts of common law. Id. These courts were “jealous and distrustful of 
a tribunal which they regarded as alien [and] succeeded in reducing it to a position of comparative 
impotence. Their general point of view was that nothing should be left to the admiralty of which the 
common-law courts could conveniently take cognizance.” Id. 
 22. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
 23. Id. at 2. Scholars disagree, however, what the breadth of these courts’ jurisdiction actually 
was. Morrison, supra note 21, at 3. The commonly held view is that their jurisdiction was as broad as 
that of European maritime courts. Id. Other scholars argue that the vice-admiralty court’s jurisdiction 
was actually as narrow as the British High Court of Admiralty. Id. at n.4. The vice-admiralty courts 
maintained jurisdiction over maritime law until the American Revolution. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 
2, at 2. 
 24. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The different states applied different substantive and procedural principles to their admiralty 
courts. Id. Some of these procedures were “foreign to admiralty” or prohibited appeals. Id. Other states 
“refused to comply with decrees of the federal appellate tribunal which reversed state court decisions.” 
Id. 
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federal power over admiralty and maritime matters.”27 Like the system 
adopted in the Articles of Confederation, however, the Constitution 
continued to separate admiralty courts and rules from common law 
courts.
28
 
B. The Development of American Admiralty Law 
The United States Constitution provides the federal courts with 
jurisdiction over six different types of controversies, treating admiralty 
law separately from other areas.
29
 The Framers distinguished “all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority”30 from “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”31 
The entire body of American admiralty law has developed from this one 
statement.
32
 The Constitutional provision on admiralty, however, “defines 
only the judicial power of the Supreme Court.”33 
 
 
 27. Id. at 2–3. The lack of debate among the Founders to include a clause on admiralty in the 
Constitution demonstrates that a strong “federal interest in maritime matters and shipping seems to 
have been taken for granted.” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 1. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 29. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between 
Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” 
Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. This is the only time the “Constitution delegates jurisdiction over an entire subject matter 
to the federal judiciary.” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 1. 
 32. Id. The placement of this clause “may have been intended only as a delegation to the federal 
sovereign of the power to prescribe the courts which could adjudicate cases involving maritime 
matters, and not a delegation to the federal courts of the power to develop substantive rules of decision 
in admiralty courts.” MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
clause of the Constitution as granting three powers. “(1) It empowered Congress to confer admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction on the ‘Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court’ which were authorized by 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law ‘inherent in the 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ and to continue the development of this law within constitution 
limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the 
Constitution.” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 1–2 (quoting Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 
358 U.S. 354, 360–61 (1959)). In DeLovio v. Boit, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of 
American admiralty law by declaring that it was not limited by English admiralty law. Id. at 2 (quoting 
DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 443 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)). 
 33. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 2. 
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In the First Judiciary Act, Congress granted federal district courts with 
the power to hear all maritime causes of action,
34
 “yet saved to suitors in 
all cases ‘the right of the common-law remedy, where the common law is 
competent to give it.’”35 The “saving to suitors” clause “reserves the right 
of a plaintiff to bring his claims in any competent forum he chooses, 
provided that the forum is authorized to enforce the right conferred by 
maritime law.”36 This allows a party with a cause of action that may be 
brought in admiralty to bring a common law claim in state court or, if the 
claim has diversity of citizenship and the appropriate jurisdictional 
amount, in federal court without reference to admiralty.
37
 However, by 
choosing to bring suit in a state common law court, the party forfeits the 
right to bring an admiralty cause of action. 
The “modern statutory formulation of the grant of admiralty 
jurisdiction,”38 codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, states: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the 
courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime 
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which 
they are otherwise entitled. (2) Any prize brought into the United 
States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken 
as prize.
39
 
This statute preserves both federal jurisdiction over claims brought “in 
admiralty” and the state court access of the“saving to suitors” provision of 
the First Judiciary Act.
40
 There are still limited circumstances, however, 
where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty claims.
41
 
 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 280 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006))). 
 36. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 280. “This general rule applies where the right is of such a nature 
that adequate relief may be given in such an action at law.” Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 5. 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
 40. See supra note 35. 
 41. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 280.  
Through statutes, Congress has provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over several types 
of maritime actions, including actions under the Limitation of Liability Act, the Ship 
Mortgage Act, the Death on the High Seas Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act, and the Public 
Vessels Act. Further, federal courts have exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over in rem 
proceedings against a vessel or other maritime property, including the foreclosure of a 
preferred ship mortgage under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.  
Id. at 281. 
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C. Procedural American Admiralty Law Prior to 1966 
“In the early days of the federal judiciary,” one judge heard all 
admiralty, legal, and equitable claims even though the three areas were 
understood to have “separate courts.”42 As a result, “each federal court had 
three dockets or ‘sides.’”43 If a litigant brought a claim under the court’s 
admiralty jurisdiction, “the case would be placed on the admiralty docket 
and would be processed through application of special admiralty rules.”44 
Suits brought under the court’s legal or equitable jurisdiction were placed 
on either the court’s legal or equitable docket.45 
The divided docket system resulted in the development of divided rules 
of procedure.
46
 The development of such rules in admiralty has rested 
mostly with the federal courts.
47
 Perhaps “[t]he most important distinction 
between the law and admiralty ‘sides’”48 of the federal court is the trier of 
fact.
49
 Historically, the court served as the trier of fact for suits in 
admiralty.
50
 In Waring v. Clarke, the Supreme Court held that it was 
constitutionally permissible for the trial court to remain the trier of fact 
without violating the Constitution.
51
 The Seventh Amendment,
52
 the Court 
determined, does not guarantee a trial by jury for suits in admiralty.
53
 The 
Court acknowledged that suits in admiralty are distinct from suits in 
common law,
54
 and because the Seventh Amendment makes specific 
reference to “[s]uits in common law,”55 it does not apply in admiralty.56 
 
 
 42. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 392. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Fitzgerald v. United States, 374 U.S. 16, 20–21 (1963) (“Article III of the Constitution 
vested in the federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases, and, since that time, the 
Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of 
admiralty law. This Court has long recognized its power and responsibility in this area and has 
exercised that power where necessary to do so.”). 
 48. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 398. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 392. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847); Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20. 
 51. 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847). 
 52. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in 
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
VII. 
 53. Waring, 46 U.S. at 460 (“We confess, then, we cannot see how [suits in admiralty] are to be 
embraced in the seventh amendment of the constitution, providing that in suits at common law the trial 
by jury should be preserved.”). 
 54. Id. at 458. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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Historically, the admiralty trier of fact caused problems even within the 
distinct admiralty docket of federal courts.
57
 As suggested earlier,
58
 federal 
courts have had broad discretion in shaping admiralty law. Congress, 
however, statutorily granted jury rights for specific admiralty claims.
59
 For 
example, the Jones Act grants a seaman injured in the course of 
employment the right to a trial by jury.
60
 In Fitzgerald v. United States,
61
 a 
seaman brought multiple admiralty claims against his employer, including 
a Jones Act claim. The Supreme Court weighed the Jones Act jury right 
against the historical use of bench trials in the other admiralty actions.
62
 
The Court determined that when admiralty claims with a jury right are 
factually intertwined with admiralty claims without a jury right, the jury 
should decide the facts of the entire case.
63
 In its analysis, the Court noted,  
Where, as here, a particular mode of trial being used by many 
judges is so cumbersome, confusing, and time consuming that it 
places completely unnecessary obstacles in the paths of litigants 
seeking justice in our courts, we should not and do not hesitate to 
 
 
 56. Waring, 46 U.S. at 460. “But there is no provision, as the constitution originally was, from 
which it can be inferred that civil causes in admiralty were to be tried by a jury, contrary to what the 
framers of the constitution knew was the mode of trial of issues of fact in the admiralty.” Id. 
 57. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 58. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 59. See supra note 41. Among these statutes is the Great Lakes Act. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 
286. Under the law, “In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of 
contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward, enrolled and licensed 
for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between places in 
different states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, the trial of all issues of fact 
shall be by jury if either party demands it.” 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (2006). 
 60. “A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the 
personal representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by 
jury, against the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or 
death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006). 
 61. 374 U.S. 16 (1963). 
 62. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 17 (1963). The Fitzgerald plaintiff was a 
seaman who was injured upon his employer’s vessel. Id. He brought suit against his employer alleging 
three causes of action: (1) violation of the Jones Act, which carried a jury right; (2) unseaworthiness of 
the vessel; and (3) claims for failure to pay maintenance and cure. The last two claims both were 
historically tried by the bench. Id. The Fitzgerald plaintiff demanded a jury trial for the entire action. 
Id. The trial court denied this request and allowed only the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims to be 
tried before a jury. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this 
holding. Id. 
 63. Id. at 21.  
And since Congress in the Jones Act has declared that the negligence part of the claim shall 
be tried by a jury, we would not be free, even if we wished, to require submission of all the 
claims to the judge alone. Therefore, the jury, a time-honored institution in our jurisprudence, 
is the only tribunal competent under the present congressional enactments to try all the 
claims. 
Id. 
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take action to correct the situation. Only one trier of fact should be 
used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one 
claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical 
developments.
64
 
Many courts have cited this analysis when determining the trier of fact in 
hybrid admiralty-civil cases which do not involve the Jones Act.
65
 
The three-part federal docket system
66
 was not changed until 1938, 
when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted.
67
 These rules 
unified the federal courts’ law and equity dockets,68 initially leaving 
admiralty alone in its separate docket.
69
 In 1958, however, Congress took 
note of admiralty’s isolation and charged “the Judicial Conference with the 
responsibility of aiding the [Supreme] Court in its rule-making 
functions”70 Based on the recommendations of the Advisory Committees 
and scholars, who desired to modernize admiralty so that “all may know 
it”71 and to prevent the dismissal of suits “for being filed on the wrong 
‘side’ of the court,”72 in 1966 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
merged with admiralty.
73
  
 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 2007); Wilmington Trust 
v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1991); Koch Fuels, Inc. 
v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 1983); Harrison v. Flota 
Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 987–88 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 66. Suits in admiralty, law, and equity each had their own docket. See supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
 67. MARAIST ET AL., supra note 2, at 392. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 393. Adding to the separation was the terminology used in each docket. Under the 
admiralty rules, “[p]laintiffs were called ‘libellants’; defendants were ‘respondents’; complaints were 
‘libels’; and lawyers were ‘proctors in admiralty.’” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 9. 
 70. Currie, supra note 7, at 5. The Conference then established the Committee on Rule of 
Practice and Procedure “and the several Advisory Committees, including the Advisory Committee on 
Admiralty Rules.” Id. at 6. The Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules then began a study of the 
possibility of unification between admiralty and civil procedure. Id. This study was divided into two 
questions: “whether unification was feasible and whether it was desirable.” Id. at 7. The Advisory 
Committee study showed that “unification was feasible with a greater degree of uniformity than had 
previously been supposed. There were already large areas of agreement between the two sets of rules.” 
Id. at 8. 
 71. Id. at 13. 
 72. Id. at 14. “Clearly, the admiralty practice needs to be modernized and to be stated so that all 
may know it; just as clearly, the modern rules that are needed are to be found in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. There can be no justification for non-functional procedural differences.” Id. at 13–14. 
 73. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
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D. Procedural American Admiralty Law After 1966 
While the merger of admiralty and civil law in 1966 allowed litigants 
to maintain hybrid admiralty-civil suits, it did not result in complete 
unification of the two systems.
74
 Certain special rules remain which only 
apply to admiralty cases.
75
 These rules are preserved either in the 
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims or are interspersed 
among the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
76
 For example, 
Rule F, the Limitation of Liability provision of the Supplement Rules,
77
 
“allows a vessel owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned 
without the owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the 
owner’s interest in the vessel.”78 Among the interspersed special admiralty 
rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are Rule 9(h)
79
 and Rule 
38(e).
80
 Rule 9(h) has two purposes: first, it allows a litigant to designate 
his claim as one within the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction when 
there are multiple bases of jurisdiction;
81
 second, it recognizes “that 
admiralty jurisdiction does not apply to an entire case, but claim by 
claim.”82 This designation “triggers the applicability of special 
procedures” for admiralty claims.83 
 
 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. Id. 
 76. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 10. 
 77. This rule provides that, except in cases involving personal injury or death, “the liability of the 
owner of a vessel for any claim, debt, or liability described in subsection (b) shall not exceed the value 
of the vessel and pending freight. If the vessel has more than one owner, the proportionate share of the 
liability of any one owner shall not exceed that owner’s proportionate interest in the vessel and 
pending freight.” 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a) (2006). Subsection (b) includes cases, “arising from any 
embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the 
vessel, any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, 
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) 
(2006). 
 78. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (2001). 
 79.  
If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction on some other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an 
admiralty or maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and the Supplemental 
Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. A claim cognizable 
only in the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is an admiralty or maritime claim for those 
purposes, whether or not so designated. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). 
 80. “These rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an admiralty or 
maritime claim under Rule 9(h).” FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e). 
 81. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 10. 
 82. George Rutherglen, The Federal Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Cases: A Verdict of 
Quiescent Years, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 581, 589 (1996). Rule 9(h)’s language allows “‘a statement 
identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim.’ The use of the word ‘claim’ makes a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A plaintiff’s election to bring suit under the federal court’s admiralty 
jurisdiction “carries with it significant consequences.”84 For example, 
under admiralty jurisdiction, a plaintiff may “arrest” and bring suit against 
property, most commonly a vessel, through an in rem proceeding.
85
 A 
plaintiff may also “obtain[] in personam jurisdiction rather than by service 
of process (attachment or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction).”86 Perhaps the most 
limiting of these consequences, however, is the admiralty plaintiff’s 
general inability to have a trial by jury.
87
 Rule 38(e) provides that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not create a right to a jury trial on 
issues in a claim that is an admiralty or maritime claim under 9(h).”88 
As a result of the 1966 unification, litigants can now join admiralty and 
non-admiralty claims into a single hybrid case.
89
 This joinder has 
exacerbated the tension between common law and admiralty triers of 
fact,
90
 and courts have struggled to determine which fact-finder should 
hear these hybrid cases.
91
 Admiralty and non-admiralty claims can be 
joined into a single federal action through one of two routes.
92
 First, 
admiralty claims can be joined to non-admiralty claims that have either 
diversity of citizenship
93
 or address a federal question,
94
 because these are 
independent bases for federal jurisdiction.
95
 In utilizing this route, it is 
important to recognize that “maritime actions arising under the general 
maritime law are not claims that arise under the ‘Constitution, treaties, or 
 
 
difference precisely in those cases in which a single action contains claims both inside and outside of 
admiralty.” Id. 
 83. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 10. 
 84. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 285. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. Recall that some admiralty plaintiffs may have a statutorily created right to a trial by jury. 
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e). 
 89. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 277; FED. R. CIV. P. 18. For example, an insurance company may 
bring an admiralty action seeking a declaration that it is not obligated under the terms of a marine 
insurance policy to provide coverage for damage to a vessel. The vessel owner may file a compulsory 
breach of contract counterclaim under civil law. These two claims may be heard in court as one hybrid 
case. See Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Bachmann, 314 F. Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Wisc. 2004). 
 90. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Hassinger v. Tideland Elec. Membership Corp., 627 F. Supp. 65, 75 (E.D.N.C. 
1985). 
 92. Adams v. James Transp., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-00036-R, 2010 WL 4789290, at *2 (W.D. Ky. 
Nov. 17, 2010). 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 95. George K. Walker, Supplemental, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction in Admiralty and 
Maritime Cases: The ALI Federal Judicial Code Revision Project and Admiralty Practice, 32 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 567, 567 (2001). 
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laws of the United States’ for purposes of invoking federal question 
jurisdiction.”96  
Second, non-admiralty claims lacking an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction can be joined to admiralty claims if they “form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.”97 The Supreme Court determined in United Mine Workers 
v. Gibbs
98
 that to form the same case or controversy, the federal and non-
federal claims must “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”99 
This type of joinder fell under either the doctrine of ancillary or pendant 
jurisdiction.
100
 In 1990, however, Congress codified the two doctrines 
“under the heading of supplemental jurisdiction.”101 Federal courts now 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these non-federal claims.
102
 In 
determining whether the court or jury should serve as the fact-finder in 
hybrid admiralty-civil cases, courts use separate analyses based on which 
joinder route—independent or supplemental—created the hybrid case.103 
III. JURY RIGHT WHEN AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION EXISTS 
The greatest tension between admiralty bench trials and common law 
jury trials exists when litigants join admiralty and non-admiralty claims 
 
 
 96. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at 102. This principle was established in Romero v. 
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). In Romero, the plaintiff seaman brought 
suit against four corporate defendants. Id. at 356. The seaman asserted liability under the Jones Act for 
personal injuries in addition to liability under general maritime law for unseaworthiness of the vessel, 
maintenance and cure, and a maritime tort. Id. He asserted federal jurisdiction under the Jones Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). Id. at 357. The 
district court dismissed all of the seaman’s claims, holding that it did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Id. at 357–58. Although the Court recognized that “all cases to which ‘judicial power’ 
extends ‘arise,’ in a comprehensive, non-jurisdictional sense of the term, ‘under this Constitution,’” it 
still determined that admiralty cases are not “‘Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States.’” Id. at 368. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted 
that “[n]ot only does language and construction point to the rejection of any infusion of general 
maritime jurisdiction into the Act of 1875,” which outlined judicial power, “but history and reason 
powerfully support that rejection.” Id. 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). 
 98. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
 99. Id. at 725. 
 100. Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 587. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 103. Adams v. James Transp. LLC, No. 5:09-CV-00036-R, 2010 WL 4789290, at *2 (W.D. Ky. 
Nov. 17, 2010). Compare Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 
1978), with Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other 
grounds, 477 U.S. 207. 
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through the first route, an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
104
 
This scenario arises often when a plaintiff files suit under the federal 
court’s admiralty jurisdiction105 and the defendant responds by filing a 
compulsory counterclaim outside of admiralty jurisdiction.
106
 Under Rule 
13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,  
A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that . . . the 
pleader has against an opposing party if the claim; (A) arises out of 
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party’s claim; and (B) does not require adding another 
party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
107
 
 
 
 104. See, e.g., Harrison, 577 F.2d 968; Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 
704 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1983); Wilmington Trust v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 
F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 105. The easiest way for the plaintiff to do this is by designating the suit under Rule 9(h). While 
Rule 9(h) does not actually require such an identifying statement in the complaint, if a plaintiff fails to 
include such a statement,  
two default rules come into play. If the claim can only be brought in federal court based on 
admiralty jurisdiction—either because it can never be brought under the savings clause or 
because on its facts it cannot be brought under any other heading of federal jurisdiction—then 
it is treated as an admiralty claim. If, on the other hand, the claim can be brought in federal 
court on some other basis, then it is treated as a claim outside of admiralty unless the 
complaint contains a statement identifying it as an admiralty claim. Such a statement can be 
added to the complaint under the general provisions for liberal amendment in Rule 15. 
Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 589. 
These default rules cause the greatest problems when the case starts in state court and the 
defendant attempts to remove it to federal court. The possibility of admiralty jurisdiction on 
removal was created by an amendment to the general removal statute allowing removal of 
claims exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The new provision, section 
1441(e), overrule[d] the traditional rule barring removal of admiralty claims. Congress 
enacted this provision apparently without considering its implications for admiralty practice. 
Nevertheless, the literal terms of section 1441(a) plainly embrace admiralty claims as ‘any 
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction.’ When admiralty claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, section 1441(e) allows removal even if it simply relieves the plaintiff of a 
mistake in filing the action in state court in the first place. Indeed, the whole point of the 
amendment is to relieve plaintiffs of the consequences of precisely this mistake. The 
congressional judgment favoring these erring plaintiffs might be doubted on grounds of 
policy, but it has as much force within admiralty as it has outside it. 
Id. at 589–90 (footnotes omitted).  
 106. See Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (a). 
Under the broad test for Rule 13(a) counterclaims adopted by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit a counterclaim is compulsory when there is any ‘logical 
relationship’ between the claim and the counterclaim. A ‘logical relationship’ exists if ‘the 
same operative facts serve[] as the basis of both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon 
which the claim rests activates additional legal rights, otherwise dormant, in the defendant.’ 
Because the plaintiff’s claims, and the defendant’s counterclaims, present related questions of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/5
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The presence of such counterclaims has raised debate among the circuits 
as to “whether a defendant’s joined counterclaims [should] be tried to the 
bench along with the plaintiff’s Rule 9(h) election to proceed in admiralty 
or tried to a jury in accordance with the defendant’s right to a jury trial 
when based on non[-]admiralty jurisdictional grounds.”108 
In analyzing this question, the circuits have adopted one of three 
approaches. The first approach, which the majority of courts accept,
109
 
prioritizes a plaintiff’s election to bring an action under Rule 9(h) by 
preserving a bench trial for the entire case.
110
 The second approach 
recognizes the authority of both parties’ competing interests and looks to 
sever the two claims when possible.
111
 The third approach prioritizes the 
defendant’s Seventh Amendment right by trying the entire case before a 
jury.
112
 
A. Majority Approach 
In 1978, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated the 
majority approach in Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A.
113
 
 
 
law and fact, judicial economy is best served by hearing all of the parties’ claims in a single 
proceeding. 
Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 291 (footnotes omitted). 
 108. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 292. 
 109. Adams v. James Transp., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-00036-R, 2010 WL 4789290, at *2 (W.D. Ky. 
Nov. 17, 2010). The Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have adopted this view. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolobiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978); St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Lago Canyon, Inc., 561 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2009); Windsor v. 
Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 111. See Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 112. See, e.g., In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2007); Wilmington Trust v. 
United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1991); Canal Barge Co. v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98 C 0509, 2002 WL 206054 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 113. 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978). Prior to Harrison, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California addressed the issue in Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters Inc., 54 F.R.D. 
192 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In Alaska Barite, the plaintiff filed suit for breach of an alleged contract of 
affreightment identifying the action as an admiralty claim under Rule 9(h). Thereafter, the defendant 
filed a counterclaim requesting a jury and charging the plaintiff with violation of antitrust laws. 
Explaining that the purpose of the Rule 9(h) designation is to allow the moving party who could either 
bring suit under admiralty or civil law to elect which form of proceeding he chooses, the district court 
held that the plaintiff had a right to a nonjury trial. The court further held, that the rights invoked by 
making an election under Rule 9(h) were not meant to be negated whenever a defendant makes a 
counterclaim outside of admiralty. 
In 1977, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas confronted the 
issue in Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bauer Dredging Co., 74 
F.R.D. 461 (S.D. Tex. 1977). In Arkwright-Boston, the plaintiff, a secondary insurance 
carrier, sought a declaration that it was not liable on a marine insurance policy because the 
defendant had breached one of the policy’s covenants. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking 
damages from the insurer, and demanded a jury trial. Stating that “[t]he sole question here is 
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In Harrison, a longshoreman working aboard a vessel was injured when 
three barrels containing a liquid chemical were damaged.
114
 After the 
longshoreman developed diffuse pulmonary fibrosis and emphysema from 
the accident, he brought suit in federal court against the vessel owner for 
negligence and unseaworthiness.
115
 The longshoreman identified his suit 
as within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction under Rule 9(h).116 The vessel 
owner then impleaded the longshoreman’s employer, “alleging the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel, if any, was due to the employer’s 
negligence.”117 The employer responded by filing a fourth-party complaint 
against the shipper of the liquid chemical under the court’s diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction.
118
 The shipper asserted a jury trial right on the 
employer’s claim.119 The vessel owner and longshoreman both responded 
by asserting claims against the shipper.
120
 Again, the longshoreman 
asserted the court’s admiralty jurisdiction under Rule 9(h) over all of his 
claims.
121
 The trial court rejected the shipper’s jury request and tried the 
entire case before the bench.
122
 The court awarded judgment solely against 
the shipper.
123
 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s jury trial 
rejection.
124
 The court began its analysis by tracing the circuit’s historical 
adoption of the principle that the plaintiff’s authority to determine 
procedural consequences must be respected.
125
 The court cited Romero v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
126
 for support, determining that Romero 
 
 
which party has the right to characterize this action,” the district court held that the plaintiff’s 
Rule 9(h) designation of the action as an admiralty and maritime claim precluded the jury trial 
demanded by the defendant. The court went on to state that there was “no compelling reason 
to hold otherwise,” and “[i]f a defendant in an admiralty action . . . could so easily defeat the 
court’s admiralty jurisdiction, it would destroy the use of such relief in maritime cases by 
making a mockery of the plaintiff’s right to designate his action as a Rule 9(h) claim.” 
Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 297–98 (footnotes omitted). 
 114. Harrison, 577 F.2d at 972. 
 115. Id. at 973. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 985. 
 120. Id. at 973. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 974. 
 125. Id. at 986. 
 126. 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975). In Romero, an injured employee brought suit against his 
employer and vessel owner for unseaworthiness and other claims. Romero, 515 F.2d at 1251. The 
plaintiff employee alleged federal jurisdiction under both Rule 9(h) and diversity of citizenship. Id. at 
1252. In determining that the plaintiff employee was not entitled to a jury trial, the Court stated,  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/5
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demonstrated that “by electing to proceed under [Rule] 9(h) rather than by 
invoking diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff may preclude the defendant 
from invoking the right to trial by jury which may otherwise exist.”127 This 
right, the court concluded, was not intended to be changed when the 
admiralty and civil rules were merged in 1966.
128
 The court cited the 
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 9(h) to support this conclusion.129 
The court also noted that because the fourth-party complaint was based 
“upon the same set of operative facts which gave rise to the first 
complaint,” the admiralty trier of fact should be preserved.130 Finally, the 
court distinguished its decision from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fitzgerald
131
 because the fairness and judicial economy concerns in that 
case were based on a plaintiff’s, not a defendant’s, jury trial request.132  
 
 
Romero could have obtained a jury trial on all claims simply by omitting or withdrawing the 
9(h) designation in his complaint and bringing his entire suit as a civil action. Yet, he 
persistently refused to seek an amendment aimed at withdrawing the admiralty identification. 
We can find no logical purpose for this refusal in the face of his repeatedly professed desire 
for a jury. The effect of appellant’s inaction, however, was to leave the jury issue in doubt 
right up to the day of trial. In these circumstances the trial judge would have correctly 
exercised his discretion in refusing to empanel a jury. Therefore, whatever appellant’s theory, 
this case was properly tried without a jury. 
Id. at 1254 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 127. Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
Many claims, however, are cognizable by the district courts whether asserted in admiralty or 
in a civil action, assuming the existence of a non[-]maritime ground of jurisdiction. Thus at 
present the pleader has [the] power to determine procedural consequences by the way in 
which he exercises the classic privilege given by the saving-to-suitors clause (28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333) or by equivalent statutory provisions. For example, a longshoreman’s claim for 
personal injuries suffered by reason of the unseaworthiness of a vessel may be asserted in a 
suit in admiralty or, if diversity of citizenship exists, in a civil action. One of the important 
procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial, while 
in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute. . . . The 
unified rules must therefore provide some device for preserving the present power of the 
pleader to determine whether these historically maritime procedures shall be applicable to his 
claim or not; the pleader must be afforded some means of designating his claim as the 
counterpart of the present suit in admiralty, where its character as such is not clear. . . . Other 
methods of solving the problem were carefully explored, but the Advisory Committee 
concluded that the preferable solution is to allow the pleader who now has power to 
determine procedural consequences by filing a suit in admiralty to exercise that power under 
unification, for the limited instances in which procedural differences will remain, by a simple 
statement in his pleading to the effect that the claim is an admiralty or maritime claim. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h), Advisory Committee Note. 
 130. Harrison, 577 F.2d at 987. 
 131. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 132. Harrison, 577 F.2d at 987. 
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B. Minority Approaches 
The minority of courts have adopted one of the two remaining 
approaches
133
 when determining whether a judge or a jury should decide 
the facts in a hybrid admiralty-civil case.
134
 The first approach uses 
severability to preserve both litigants’ fact-finder rights, while the second 
approach requires a uniform trial by jury. 
1. Severability Approach 
The first minority approach holds that, if possible, courts should sever 
admiralty claims from non-admiralty claims. This approach was 
articulated in Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil.
135
 
In Koch, an oil company sought out a barge company to ship its oil.
136
 
After the two companies allegedly reached an agreement, the barge 
company took possession of the oil.
137
 Communication between the 
companies, however, broke down before the oil could be shipped to its 
final destination. When the barge company refused to return the oil, the oil 
company brought an in rem action for possession of the oil cargo under 
Rule 9(h).
138
 The barge owner “intervened, filed a claim to the cargo, and 
filed a counterclaim against [the oil company] . . . for breach of the charter 
agreement.”139 The claim for breach of agreement was not brought under 
Rule 9(h), so the trial court severed it and ordered it be tried by a jury, 
while the in rem proceeding was tried before the court.
140
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the severance on 
appeal.
141
 In so doing, the court noted two significant Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Rule 9(h) and Rule 42(b).
142
 Similarly to the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion in Harrison,143 the Eighth Circuit determined that when a 
plaintiff identifies his or her suit under Rule 9(h), “[g]enerally, such an 
 
 
 133. Supra notes 111–12. 
 134. See, e.g., In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2007); Wilmington Trust v. 
United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1991); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo 
of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 135. 704 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 136. Koch, 704 F.2d at 1039. 
 137. Id. at 1040. 
 138. Id. at 1039–40. 
 139. Id. at 1039. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1044. 
 142. Id. at 1041–42. 
 143. See supra note 124. 
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election precludes a jury trial.”144 Unlike Harrison, however, the Eighth 
Circuit’s analysis continued beyond Rule 9(h). The court sought direction 
from Rule 42(b), which allows for the separation of trials in furtherance 
of, inter alia, “preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by 
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.”145 To balance the competing 
interests of Rule 9(h) and Rule 42(b), the court looked to the facts 
underpinning each of the two claims.
146
 The barge owner’s claim for 
breach of contract relied on the existence of a charter agreement.
147
 The oil 
company claimed, however, that “whether or not a charter agreement 
existed, [the barge owner] wrongfully converted cargo belonging to [the 
oil company].”148 
These factual distinctions allowed the court to reach a conclusion 
different from the Supreme Court in Fitzgerald.
149
 The Eighth Circuit 
opined that the Court in Fitzgerald could “achieve[] each of the ends of 
economy, clarity, and preserving the right to a jury trial,”150 by having one 
trier of fact because the claims were “essentially one lawsuit . . . split 
conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments.”151 
The “instant case, however differ[ed] . . . in that it involve[d] more than 
‘essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim.’”152 In these situations, 
“[w]here . . . both parties, using different triers of fact, could prevail on 
their respective claims without prejudicing the other party or arriving at 
inconsistent results, a trial judge may separate the claims in the interests of 
preserving constitutional rights, clarity, or judicial economy.”153 In Koch, 
the court chose to prioritize the jury right over clarity and judicial 
economy.
154
 The Eighth Circuit failed, however, to address who should 
serve as the fact-finder when the hybrid case cannot be severed. 
 
 
 144. Koch, 704 F.2d at 1041. The court cited the same language from the Advisory Committee 
Notes as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did in Harrison, supra note 129. 
 145. Koch, 704 F.2d at 1042 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b)). 
 146. Id. at 1042. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra note 63. 
 150. Koch, 704 F.2d at 1042. 
 151. Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. United States, 374 U.S. 16, 21 (1963)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. 
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2. Uniform Jury Trial Approach 
The second of the two minority approaches, which holds that the 
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury should be preserved at the 
expense of an admiralty claimant’s historical bench trial, was articulated in 
In re Lockheed Martin Corp.
155
 The dispute in Lockheed Martin stemmed 
from a vessel accident.
156
 The vessel owner submitted a claim for coverage 
to its maritime insurance provider nearly four years after the accident.
157
 
Upon receiving the claim, the insurance provider filed two declaratory 
actions in federal court under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.158 The 
insurance provider claimed in its first declaratory action that the vessel 
owner was time-barred from submitting a coverage claim.
159
 In the second 
declaratory action, the insurance provider requested that in the alternative, 
the court determine the vessel owner’s amount of loss.160 In its answer, the 
vessel owner counterclaimed with a breach of contract claim against the 
insurance provider.
161
 The vessel owner asserted federal jurisdiction over 
its counterclaim under diversity of citizenship
162
 and requested a jury trial. 
When the district court determined that the vessel owner did not have a 
jury trial right,
163
 the vessel owner filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus
164
 with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
165
 
 
 
 155. 503 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 156. Id. at 353. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. The second declaratory action was added when the insurance provider amended its 
complaint. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See supra note 93. 
 163. After answering, the vessel owner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Lockheed 
Martin, 503 F.3d at 353. It argued that the insurance provider’s first declaratory action should be 
dismissed because under the policy, the vessel owner had six years to file a coverage claim. Id. It then 
argued that the district court should use its discretion to dismiss the second declaratory action so that 
the vessel owner’s counterclaim, which raised the same issues, could be tried before a jury. Id. The 
district court dismissed the insurance provider’s first declaratory action after it determined that the 
policy had a six year limitation period, but refused to accept that the vessel owner had a jury trial right, 
thereby not dismissing the insurance provider’s second declaratory action. Id. 
 164. A writ of mandamus is “a writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by 
a lower court or a governmental officer or body, usually to correct a prior action or failure to act.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1046–47 (9th ed. 2009). The vessel owner claimed in its petition that the 
district court’s ruling deprived it of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Lockheed Martin, 503 
F.3d at 353. Before addressing the vessel owner’s jury trial demand, the Fourth Circuit first held that 
the writ of mandamus was properly sought, because while the “mandamus is a drastic remedy that 
should only be used in extraordinary circumstances and may not be used as a substitute for appeal . . . 
[it] is the proper way to challenge the denial of a jury trial.” Id. 
 165. Id. 
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The Fourth Circuit granted the vessel owner’s petition and directed the 
district court to try the case before a jury.
166
 In coming to this conclusion, 
the court relied heavily on the relationship between the “saving to suitors” 
clause
167
 and the Seventh Amendment.
168
 The court determined that when 
a litigant pursues a maritime claim in federal court as a common law 
action under the “saving to suitors” clause, the claim is treated 
substantively as an admiralty action and procedurally as a common law 
action, thereby requiring the application of the Seventh Amendment.
169
 
The vessel owner’s counterclaim, the court concluded, therefore carried 
with it the right to a jury.
170
 
In balancing the insurance provider’s election to proceed in admiralty 
with the vessel owner’s common law counterclaim, the Fourth Circuit 
directly opposed the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Harrison.171 The Fourth 
Circuit determined that if either party elected to pursue a maritime claim at 
common law, the Seventh Amendment must apply to the entire case.
172
 To 
do otherwise, the court held, would “permit the plaintiff’s choice of a 
customary but not constitutionally required mode of trial to prevent a 
defendant from taking advantage of his constitutionally guaranteed mode 
of trial.”173 Such an action would be “inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial must 
be preserved ‘wherever possible.’”174 
IV. JURY RIGHT WHEN NO INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION EXISTS 
The second route for joining admiralty and non-admiralty claims, 
supplemental jurisdiction, has undergone far less analysis by courts than 
the first route. When examining jury rights under this second route, courts 
have often ignored the approaches used in the first route and adopted new 
paths for analysis.
175
 Courts encountering claims lacking independent 
 
 
 166. Id. at 360. 
 167. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 168. Lockheed Martin, 503 F.3d at 354. 
 169. Id. “An admiralty plaintiff who chooses to proceed ‘at law,’ whether in state or federal court, 
thus has the right under the saving-to-suitors clause to demand a jury trial.” Id. 
 170. Id. at 357. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 358. 
 174. Id. (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959)). 
 175. See, e.g., Adams v. James Transp. Inc., No. 5:09-CV-00036-R, 2010 WL 4789290, at *2 
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 17, 2010); In re Poling Transp. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 779, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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bases for federal jurisdiction begin their analysis by separating cases 
involving limitation of liability proceedings,
176
 an admiralty proceeding 
which allows a vessel owner without privity or knowledge of wrongful 
acts to limit his or her liability to the value of the vessel after such acts, 
from those which do not involve such a proceeding.
177
 This separation 
occurs because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
limitation of liability proceedings.
178
 If a plaintiff elects to bring his or her 
claim in state court,
179
 the defendant may remove the case to federal court 
by initiating a limitation of liability proceeding.
180
 
A. Non-Limitation of Liability Proceedings 
Within cases excluding limitation of liability proceedings, courts have 
adopted minority and majority approaches.
181
 The difference between the 
two approaches revolves around the relative impact of the nature of the 
supplemental claim. 
1. Minority Approach 
When admiralty is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in non-
limitation of liability proceedings, the minority of courts have adopted the 
approach that no matter the circumstances, a supplemental jury right 
should not trump the traditional admiralty bench trial.
182
 The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated this approach in Tallentire v. 
Offshore Logistics, Inc.
183
 In Tallentire, representatives of workers killed 
in a helicopter crash off the shores of Louisiana brought suit against the 
helicopter owner and operator.
184
 The suit included claims under the 
federal Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and Louisiana law.
185
 The 
 
 
 176. See supra note 77. The Limitation of Liability Act “was designed to encourage investment 
and protect vessel owners from unlimited exposure to liability.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 
531 U.S. 438, 453 (2001). 
 177. See, e.g., Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1985) rev’d on other 
grounds, 477 U.S. 207; Churchill v. F/V Fjord, 892 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1988). The distinction between 
cases with and without limitation of liability proceedings is made because federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over limitation of liability proceedings. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 281. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Such an action almost always makes the right to trial by jury available. 
 180. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 282. Jury trial rights are much more available in state court. 
 181. See In re Poling Transp. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 779, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 182. See, e.g., Tallentire, 754 F.2d at 1287; Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Third National Bank of Ashland, 
Ky., 557 F. Supp. 862, 872 (E.D. Ky. 1983). 
 183. 754 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 477 U.S. 207. 
 184. 754 F.2d at 1276. 
 185. Id. 
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representatives requested a jury trial for their Louisiana claims, but the 
case was tried before the bench.
186
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined 
that the representatives did not have a right to a trial by jury in federal 
court.
187
 In its analysis, the court relied on both the traditional trial of 
admiralty claims before the bench
188
 and the limited exception recognized 
in Fitzgerald
189
 for a jury trial when an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction exists.
190
 The court rationalized that because the 
representatives’ state law claims could only be heard in federal court 
through either admiralty or supplemental jurisdiction, they did not require 
an exception to the traditional bench trial.
191
 The court’s opinion 
concluded without an analysis of the nature of the supplemental claims. 
2. Majority Approach 
When admiralty is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in non-
limitation of liability proceedings, the majority of courts have adopted the 
approach that the supplemental claim’s jury right should be preserved 
when the injury asserted is physical damage or death.
192
 This approach 
was articulated in Weeks v. Reliance Insurance Co. of New York.
193
 In 
Weeks, a vessel owner brought suit against its insurance provider for 
breach of contract after the provider denied the owner coverage for 
damage done to the vessel in a storm.
194
 The vessel owner also brought 
suit against the insurance broker for negligent failure to procure insurance, 
in the event the insurance provider’s denial of coverage was upheld.195 The 
suit against the insurance provider was heard under the federal court’s 
admiralty jurisdiction while the suit against the insurance broker was 
heard under the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction.196 When the 
 
 
 186. Id. at 1286. In a pretrial ruling, the district court concluded that DOHSA provided the 
exclusive remedy for the representatives and dismissed the Louisiana state claims. Id. at 1277. On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that the Louisiana state claims were 
wrongfully dismissed. Id. at 1282. 
 187. Id. at 1287. 
 188. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 63. 
 190. 754 F.2d at 1287 (citing Green v. Ross, 481 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Weeks v. Reliance Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 81 Civ. 3479-CSH, 1985 WL 462 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 28, 1985). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at *1. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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insurance broker requested a jury trial,
197
 the court denied the request and 
tried both claims before the bench.
198
 
In its denial, the court took the Tallentire analysis
199
 a step further by 
considering the nature of the supplemental claim after acknowledging the 
traditional role of bench trials in admiralty.
200
 The court cited authority
201
 
for the principle that Fitzgerald provided support for an exception to the 
traditional admiralty bench trial when a personal injury or death 
supplemental claim is joined to an admiralty claim.
202
 The court 
determined that these types of cases had historically received treatment 
different than other admiralty claims,
203
 so judges may use their discretion 
to break with the traditional bench trial.
204
 The court noted, however, that 
the current case did not involve either personal injury or death, making a 
jury trial inappropriate.
205
 
B. Limitation of Liability Proceedings 
When admiralty is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in cases 
involving limitation of liability proceedings, courts have determined the 
trier of fact based on the location of the plaintiff’s original suit.206 
Procedurally, a vessel owner may bring a limitation of liability proceeding 
only after a plaintiff has filed suit against him or her.
207
 Thus, if a plaintiff 
 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 200. Weeks, 1985 WL 462 at *2. 
 201. See Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., Inc. v. “Ming Giant”, 552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982). While the Weeks court relied on the legal theories pronounced in Ming Giant, the two cases are 
factually very distinguishable. In Ming Giant, a widow brought suit in state court against two vessel 
owners after her husband was killed in a collision of the vessels. 552 F. Supp. at 370. The vessel 
owners instituted a limitation of liability proceeding and removed the entire case to federal court. Id. 
The federal court empanelled a jury after the widow requested a jury trial for her state claims. Id. The 
jury’s “verdict could be treated as binding, advisory, or surplusage, depending on the eventual 
resolution of the issue.” Id. In the end, the court decided to treat the jury’s finding as binding because 
of the “relative weight and importance of the death claim as compared to other claims at issue in the 
limitation proceeding.” Id. at 371. 
 202. Weeks, 1985 WL 462 at *3. 
 203. One example included Congress’s adoption of the Jones Act. See supra note 60. 
 204. Weeks, 1985 WL 462 at *3. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See In re Poling Transp. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 207. FED. R. CIV. P. F.  
Not later than six months after receipt of a claim in writing, any vessel owner may file a 
complaint in the appropriate district court, as provided in subdivision (9) of this rule, for 
limitation of liability pursuant to statute. The owner (a) shall deposit with the court, for the 
benefit of claimants, a sum equal to the amount or value of the owner’s interest in the vessel 
and pending freight, or approved security therefor, and in addition such sums, or approved 
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initiates suit in federal court, the filing of a limitation of liability 
proceeding does not require a change of forum.
208
 On the other hand, if a 
plaintiff initiates suit in state court, the limitation of liability proceeding 
removes the entire case to federal court.
209
 Only in the second of these 
situations have courts honored the movant’s jury right on the supplemental 
claim.
210
 The Southern District Court of New York articulated this 
principle in Complaint of Poling Transportation Corp.
211
 
In Poling Transportation, an explosion resulted after a shore tank 
receiving gasoline from a vessel overflowed.
212
 The explosion damaged 
nearby property and caused personal injuries to those near the shore 
tank.
213
 The property owners and injured persons filed suit against the 
vessel owner and operator in state court for “injuries, economic loss and 
loss of services allegedly sustained due to the fire.”214 The vessel owner 
responded to the suit by filing a limitation of liability proceeding in federal 
court.
215
 The property owners and injured persons requested a trial by jury 
for their state claims.
216
 In granting the property owners’ and injured 
 
 
security therefor, as the court may from time to time fix as necessary to carry out the 
provisions of the statutes as amended; or (b) at the owner’s option shall transfer to a trustee to 
be appointed by the court, for the benefit of claimants, the owner’s interest in the vessel and 
pending freight, together with such sums, or approved security therefor, as the court may 
from time to time fix as necessary to carry out the provisions of the statutes as amended. The 
plaintiff shall also give security for costs and, if the plaintiff elects to give security, for 
interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of the security. 
Id. 
 208. See Churchill v. F/V Fjord, 892 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 209. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Poling Transp., 776 F. Supp. 779; Churchill, 892 F.2d 763. 
 211. 776 F. Supp. 779. 
 212. Poling Transp., 776 F. Supp. at 780. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 781. As is usual, the district court put a stay “enjoining the commencement or 
prosecution of any actions or proceedings against the [vessel owner] or their property for any loss or 
damage resulting from the fire and explosion pending the resolution of the limitation proceeding.” Id. 
at 780. 
 216. Id. To ensure the preservation of the jury right associated with their state law claims, the 
property owners and injured persons requested that the “court should try the issues raised by the 
[vessel owner’s] petition for limitation of liability without a jury, following which the court should lift 
the stay so that the remaining issues can be decided in state court, presumably with a jury.” Id. at 781. 
The property owners and injured persons first argued that this approach was proper because they 
believed the state claims were not properly within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal court. Id. 
Alternatively, if the court did have proper jurisdiction over the state claims, the property owners and 
injured persons claimed that the court “adjudicate this case in a manner that preserves their right to 
jury trial on the common law claims, that is, that it must empanel a jury in the limitation proceedings.” 
Id. In its holding, the court first determined that supplemental jurisdiction was proper because 
limitation of liability proceedings have admiralty federal jurisdiction. Id. 
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persons’ jury request,217 the court balanced three interests implicated in the 
case: “(1) the admiralty tradition disfavoring the use of a jury in limitation 
proceedings; (2) the preservation of the [property owners’ and injured 
persons’] right to a jury trial of their common law claims, as embodied in 
the ‘saving to suitors’ clause of § 1333; and (3) judicial economy.”218 
Without definitively answering whether a supplemental common law 
claim automatically has a jury trial right when paired with admiralty 
claims, the court concluded that there “is no reason to believe that the 
purposes of the Limitation Act include enabling a vessel owner to take a 
tort victim’s case away from a jury. As one court has noted, ‘[t]he 
Limitation Act was fashioned by Congress as a shield rather than a 
sword.’”219 Because the property owners and injured persons were forced 
into federal court by the limitation of liability proceeding,
220
 the court 
determined that their jury right must be preserved.
221
  
 
 
 217. Poling Transp., 776 F. Supp. at 787. 
 218. Id. at 785. 
 219. Id. at 786 (quoting In re Complaint of Cameron Boat Rental, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 577, 582 n.6 
(W.D. La. 1988)). 
 220. Three years earlier, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the presence of a 
limitation of liability proceeding does not automatically preserve a supplemental claim’s jury right. 
Churchill v. F/V Fjord, 892 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1988). In Churchill, the collision of two skiffs resulted 
in the death of one skiff passenger and serious injury to another passenger. Id. at 766. After one of the 
skiff operators was found to be intoxicated and high on marijuana, the injured passenger and 
representatives of the killed passenger filed an in personam suit against the vessel owner and an in rem 
suit against the vessel in federal court. Id. at 766–67. They also attached state wrongful death claims, 
which carried a jury right, to their case. Id. at 768. The injured passenger and representatives requested 
that the trial be heard by a jury. Id. at 769. The district court rejected this request, citing Tallentire for 
support. Id. 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that while the Tallentire general dismissal of 
supplemental jury rights might seem harsh, “to hold otherwise would contravene the manifest purpose 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(e) by allowing jury trials in admiralty cases in which plaintiffs 
allege a pendent state law claim.” Id. The court also, however, agreed with the injured passenger’s and 
representatives’ argument that when a limitation of liability proceeding forces a litigant into federal 
court, judges should recognize an exception to the Tallentire general rule. Id. In this case, however, the 
injured passenger and representatives initiated their suit in federal court. Id. The presence of the 
limitation of liability proceeding did not force them into a new forum, thereby eliminating the forum-
selection concerns present in Poling Transportation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of a jury trial. Id. 
 221. Poling Transp., 776 F. Supp. at 786. The court determined that because the facts of the 
limitation proceeding and state claims were so intertwined, 
the proper approach here is to empanel a jury at the outset and allow trial to proceed on issues 
pertaining both to limitation and the common law claims. At the close of the evidence, the 
court will determine the admiralty issues, including any preclusive effect to be given to that 
resolution. The remaining issues on the state law claims, if any, will be submitted to the jury. 
Id. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The unification of the admiralty and civil sides of the federal court 
system in 1966 called the sanctity of the traditional admiralty bench trial 
into question.
222
 Litigants’ ability to join common law and maritime claims 
now requires courts to balance two competing interests: the traditional 
admiralty bench trial and the Seventh Amendment guarantee of common 
law trials by jury. The weight given by the court to each of these interests, 
however, should vary based on whether the civil claim has a basis for 
federal jurisdiction independent of admiralty. 
A. Independent Basis for Federal Jurisdiction Exists 
When an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the common 
law claim exists, courts should undertake a two-step balancing act which 
reflects both of the minority approaches.
223
 First, courts should follow the 
Koch approach and look to sever factually distinguishable admiralty and 
common law claims.
224
 This approach acknowledges the authority 
supporting either trier of fact. For the preservation of a bench trial, this 
authority respects tradition and a plaintiff’s right to choose the procedural 
outcome of his or her case. The admiralty bench trial was originally 
adopted based on the “theory that maritime questions were so complex and 
specialized as to call for determination by a judge presumed to possess 
particular expertise in the field.”225 This principle is so deeply rooted in 
maritime law that it was preserved during the 1966 unification through 
Rule 38(e), which provides that the unification will not compel a trial by 
jury for admiralty claims.
226
 As evidenced by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Romero
227
 and the majority approach of the circuits, the 
plaintiff’s power to shape his or her trial by electing to proceed in 
admiralty should not be easily compromised. For the preservation of a jury 
trial, the authority is the constitutional guarantee of the Seventh 
Amendment for common law claims.
228
 Courts can mitigate these 
concerns, however, by severing factually distinguishable claims whenever 
possible, as was done in Koch. The prevention of compromising either the 
 
 
 222. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 111–12. 
 224. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 225. Gyorfi v. Partrederiet Atomena, 58 F.R.D. 112, 114 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 
 226. See supra note 80. 
 227. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra note 52. 
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admiralty litigant’s bench trial or common law litigant’s jury trial 
outweighs concerns of inefficiency in having two trials with the same 
parties. 
If, on the other hand, the admiralty and common law claims are so 
factually intertwined as to make severance impossible, courts should adopt 
the Lockheed Martin minority approach and try the entire case before a 
jury.
229
 The Constitution must outweigh tradition for two reasons. First, 
the traditional use of a bench trial is not a right to not have a trial by 
jury.
230
 Only the common law litigant has a constitutionally protected 
right. As articulated in Fitzgerald,
231
 while “the Seventh Amendment does 
not require jury trials in admiralty, neither the Amendment nor any other 
provision of the Constitution forbids them.”232 An admiralty jury trial 
violates tradition, while a common law bench trial violates the 
Constitution. 
Second, the jury is “a time-honored institution in our jurisprudence.”233 
The drafters of the unified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognized 
and honored this principle by including Rule 38(a), which states that the 
“right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the 
parties inviolate.”234 While the Supreme Court has not answered which 
trier of fact should be used in hybrid admiralty-civil cases, it has analyzed 
a similar situation with hybrid equity-legal cases in Beacon Theatres, Inc. 
v. Westover.
235
 In Beacon Theatres, the Court determined that the legal 
jury right could not be lost by the mere presence of equitable claims,
236
 
because “the right to [a] jury trial is a constitutional one . . . while no 
similar requirement protects trials by the court . . . [The court’s discretion] 
wherever possible, [must] be exercised to preserve [a] jury trial.”237 The 
 
 
 229. See supra note 112. 
 230. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 20. 
 233. Id. at 21. 
 234. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a). 
 235. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 236. The Seventh Amendment jury right does not extend to suits in equity. See Dairy Queen v. 
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
 237. Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959). The Beacon Theatres opinion 
also specifically addressed the role of juries in declaratory actions. In Beacon Theatres, Fox West 
Coast Theatres, Inc. brought a declaratory action against Beacon Theatres, Inc. alleging controversy 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 502. Beacon Theatres responded by filing a counterclaim at 
law and requesting a trial by jury. Id. at 503. The district court dismissed the jury request, stating that 
the question between the two theaters was essentially equitable and did not afford either party a jury 
right. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, holding “[a] party who is 
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Court’s decision in Beacon Theatres should serve as strong guidance for 
how it would analyze the trier of fact in hybrid admiralty-civil cases. 
B. No Independent Basis for Federal Jurisdiction Exists 
When an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the civil claim 
does not exist, courts should give more weight to the traditional admiralty 
bench trial. By its definition, supplemental (including pendent and 
ancillary) jurisdiction allows a court “to hear and determine a claim over 
which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction . . . .”238 If a federal court 
would not have had jurisdiction over the common law claim without the 
presence of an admiralty claim, admiralty law should be applied both 
substantively and procedurally. Again, while the Supreme Court has not 
addressed this exact issue, in determining jury rights with hybrid equity-
legal cases, the Court has only noted that “a jury right may not be 
preempted through procedural tactics”239 when analyzing claims with 
independent bases for federal jurisdiction.
240
 The lack of law analyzing 
supplemental jury rights suggests that this right does not carry the same 
weight as an admiralty litigant’s traditional bench trial. 
The general rule of no jury trial when an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction does not exist should, however, have one exception: when a 
state litigant is forced into federal court because of the initiation of a 
limitation of liability proceeding. As documented by the majority of 
courts
241
 that believe an admiralty bench trial trumps a jury right even 
when an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff’s 
power to determine the procedural outcome of his or her case is a well-
respected principle. The initiation of a limitation of liability proceeding 
already removes some of the plaintiff’s power by requiring that 
substantive general maritime law be applied.
242
 Fairness requires that a 
 
 
entitled to maintain a suit in equity for an injunction . . . may have all the issues in his suit determined 
by the judge without a jury regardless of whether legal rights are involved.” Id. at 505. 
 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court determined that Fox’s action in beating 
Beacon Theatres to the courthouse by filing an equitable declaratory action before Beacon Theatres 
could file a suit at law, did not destroy Beacon Theatre’s jury right. Id. at 504. “[I]f Beacon would 
have been entitled to a jury trial in a [suit at law] against Fox it cannot be deprived of that right merely 
because Fox took advantage of the availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon first.” Id.  
 238. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 2009). 
 239. In re Poling Transp. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 779, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 240. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
 241. See, e.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolobiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978); St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Lago Canyon, Inc., 561 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2009); Windsor v. 
Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 242. Mahfouz, supra note 9, at 281. 
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plaintiff maintain procedural guarantees originally available to him or her. 
If, however, a plaintiff initiates a hybrid admiralty-civil claim in federal 
court, the existence of a limitation of liability proceeding should not 
provide the plaintiff with a jury right.
243
 The plaintiff exerted control over 
the case when she chose to file suit in federal court. She should not have 
any more rights than the plaintiff with a hybrid case not involving a 
limitation of liability proceeding. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 1966 unification of the admiralty and civil federal dockets allows 
litigants to bring hybrid admiralty-civil cases before the court. These cases 
are created in one of two ways: when each claim has an independent basis 
for federal jurisdiction or when a civil claim with supplemental federal 
jurisdiction is joined to an admiralty claim. In the process of streamlining 
the procedure for suing in federal court, the unification failed to answer 
whether the court, the traditional admiralty trier of fact, or jury, the civil 
trier of fact guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, should serve as fact-
finder in hybrid admiralty-civil cases. Left without guidance from the 
Supreme Court, the circuits have developed competing solutions for each 
of the two types of hybrid admiralty-civil cases. When an independent 
basis for federal jurisdiction over the civil claim exists, courts should 
undertake a two-step balancing act—first looking to sever the two claims 
and then trying the entire case before a jury when such severance is 
impossible. When an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the 
civil claim does not exist, courts should prioritize the traditional admiralty 
bench trial in all cases except those where a plaintiff is forced into federal 
court through the initiation of a limitation of liability proceeding. While 
neither of these solutions is without flaw, each attempts to best balance the 
admiralty and civil litigants’ competing interests—a truly trying act. 
Lily Kurland
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